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Comments should be addressed by email to the author. Abstract 
I conduct a cross-country analysis of the human development index (HDI) components, income, 
life expectancy, literacy and gross enrolment ratios, using Gray and Purser’s 1970-2005 
quinquennial database for 111 countries. 1) A descriptive analysis uncovers a complex pattern of 
divergence and convergence for these components’ evolution. Development is not a smooth 
process but consists of a series of superposed transitions each taking off with increasing 
divergence and then converging. 2) Absolute divergence/convergence for the HDI components is 
decomposed using simultaneous growth regressions including a full set of quadratic interactions 
between the HDI components, and indicators of urbanization, trade, institutions, foreign direct 
investment and physical geography. These are implemented, first, using three stage least squares, 
all of the non-exogenous independent variables fully instrumented, and second, as independent 
regressions with errors clustered by countries, again all non-exogenous variables instrumented. 
3) A set of quantile regressions is run for the HDI component levels on the same variables (just 
the linear terms), again fully instrumented. Urbanization is a leading significant variable for 
human development indicators in both sets of estimates, stronger than trade,  FDI and 
institutional indicators. These indicators act with ambiguous signs that may result from their 
distributive impacts, reducing their effectiveness. The results indicate that improving markets 
will have smaller returns than complementing them with institutions that can coordinate 
urbanization as well as investment in human capital. Urbanization itself can provide a concrete 
agenda for development involving all aspects of economic, political and social life as well as 
human development.  
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 
 
1.  Introduction 
What are the main determinants of divergence and convergence in human development? How is 
this process interlinked with economic growth? What makes some countries catch-up in the 
different dimensions of human development, and others not? 
These questions cut deep into the formulation of the theories and policies of economic 
growth. The initial theories of growth that emerged with the Neoclassical revolution and the 
demise of Keynesianism defined the concept of convergence. As Development Economics was 
thrown out, together with its appreciation of vicious and virtuous circles, nascent theories of 
economic growth  based  simply  on extending the concepts of market equilibrium  to the 
intertemporal, dynamic context  predicted absolute convergence.  It followed that economic 
convergence across countries would result from the implementation of free markets. Findings of 
convergence were thus considered to support free market policies. However, the initial empirical 
studies on income  convergence  (Barro,  1991) found absolute  divergence  instead,  as was 
confirmed for the long-term by Pritchett (1997). Only the finding of conditional convergence has 
been robust
1
Two decades of empirical investigations left behind long-held views that economic 
growth consisted fundamentally of a process of capital accumulation, finding that human capital, 
, with absolute convergence confined to specific groups of countries. Essentially, 
what this means is that some variables move slower than income (or the variable of interest) and 
define its equilibrium levels. Variables that converge do not require much policy intervention 
while variables that move slowly, generating stratification or divergence, are reflecting the 
deeper inertias that define development and underdevelopment.  
                                                           
1 A robust negative conditional convergence coefficient means only that economic growth follows a process of 
dynamic equilibrium. This is a non-trivial finding, but only implies a local form of convergence that is consistent 
with global convergence, divergence or stratified growth. The control variables are supposed to be exogenous and to 
define the steady state trajectories. 2 
 
technology, institutions and economic geography to be essential components of the process. The 
main debate, nevertheless, is to what extent the growth process generated by markets is sufficient 
to bring about economic development, and where not, what the most effective complementary 
policies can be.  
The 1990 Human Development Report explicitly addresses these questions, and defines 
economic development as human development. Twenty years of change have followed, marked 
by globalization and events that have moved faster than our understanding of them. Gray and 
Purser’s (2009) new database on human development indicators for 111 countries ranging 
quinquenially across the period 1970-2005 provides an opportunity to take stock of these issues. 
What has been the physiognomy of convergence and divergence? What variables have most 
intervened in improving income, life expectancy, literacy and gross enrolment ratio, the four 
components of the human development index? How has globalization impacted human 
development? Can a comparative evaluation be made of the relative importance of the main 
determinants of economic growth that current research proposes? 
Now, the fact of the matter is that this area of study, centered mainly on conditional 
convergence regressions,  has produced a vast literature but nebulous results. A well-known 
investigation found that “the cross-country statistical relationship between long-run average 
growth rates and almost every particular macroeconomic indicator is fragile to small changes in 
the conditioning information set” (Levine & Renelt, 1992). This research also found “qualified 
support for the conditional-convergence hypothesis: a robust, negative correlation between the 
initial level income and growth over the 1960-1989 period when the equation includes a measure 
of the initial level of investment in human capital,” implying, as mentioned above, that human 
capital is a slow moving variable reflecting the deeper inertias that define development and 3 
 
underdevelopment. Another well-known investigation used two million regressions to find that 
regional dummies, political variables such as rule of law or political rights, religion, market 
distortions and performance, types of investment, fraction of primary products in total exports or 
of GDP in mining, openness, type of economic organization, and colonial history were on the 
whole significant determinants of economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1997).  
What these studies show is that economic and human development are complex processes 
with historical, political, economic,  institutional  and geographical determinants  that  do not 
conform to some simple linear model.  
To throw light on the evolution of human development over the period 1970-2005, I first 
conduct a descriptive study of the indicators of human development and of some of the main 
explanatory variables. The main conclusion is that economic development consists of a series of 
nonlinear transitions, characterized by an initial period of divergence followed by a subsequent 
period of convergence.  
Next I conduct two sets of estimates on cross country differences  that  evaluate two 
different aspects of growth. One is an estimate on the divergence/convergence of the human 
development index (HDI) components. This estimate decomposes the (absolute) convergence 
coefficient for each of these four indicators, to find what explanatory variables contribute to their 
convergence or divergence. To take into account the complex interaction which exists between 
the different economic variables, these regressions are fully instrumented. There are variables 
contributing to both convergence and divergence. Variables contributing to divergence are more 
critical to the growth process because they exhibit impact thresholds and increasing returns. 
The other set of estimates concentrates on differences in HDI component levels across 
countries. It consists of quantile regressions for the determinants of these levels across deciles of 4 
 
these same variables, in terms of the main explanatory variables. These regressions are also fully 
instrumented. The impact of the various determinants varies considerably across deciles. 
We compare the overall significance of the different explanatory variables for human 
development.  Urbanization is a more significant and quantitatively important protagonist of 
development than trade, institutions or geography. Per capita income, life expectancy, literacy 
and enrolment ratios also affect each other considerably. 
In what follows we first discuss the data and results. Discussion and conclusions follow. 
 
2.  Data 
The main data set is Gray and Purser’s (2009) extended quinquenial database on human the 
development index components, per capita income, life expectancy, literacy and gross enrolment 
ratios. This panel ranges over 111 countries over the period 1970-2005.  This  database  is 
complemented with data from the World Development Indicators (2008)
2 and Polity IV (2009)
3
                                                           
2 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
. 
The explanatory variables cover the following categories: institutions, trade, physical geography 
and  economic  geography.  The first three categories are regarded by researchers seeking 
exogenous determinants of economic growth as the ultimate  causes of economic growth. 
Researchers studying path dependence mainly study dynamics in human development (including 
the demographic transition), economic geography and technology. Human development indices 
are already included in the study. The only quinquennial indicator in economic geography found 
in the World Development Indicators is urbanization. There is unfortunately no suitable indicator 
for technology adoption.  
3 The Polity IV Project was originated by Will H. Moore and is currently available at the Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. Special values -66, -77, -88 used to represent 
various exceptions are replaced here with 0. We use the 2009 update. 5 
 
The set of explanatory variables that was included was therefore: trade
4
Our instrument set  includes  correlates of long-term  historical, political, economic, 
institutional and geographical determinants. These are legal origin (British, French, German or 
Scandinavian, from Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000), geographic region (East Asia Pacific, East 
Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Western Europe, North 
America, Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America and Caribbean), landlocked, tropical, latitude, 
area,  the well known malaria ecology instrument (together with a dummy indicating its 
availability, Sachs, 2003), ethnic fractionalization in 1960 (from the Easterly and Levine (1997) 
dataset) and a time period dummy. To these instruments are added their quadratic interactions. 
For instance this allows the impacts of institutional, health and period variables to vary 
substantially across geographic regions, which themselves have very different histories. Note 
that landlocked, tropical and latitude are used as exogenous controls.  
, FDI inflows, 
FDI outflows (these variables are thought to be indicators of globalization and technological 
change), executive constraints,  democracy  (these two from Polity IV),  inflation  and  risk 
premium, landlocked, tropical, latitude, urban proportion of the population, population density 
(with agricultural land as denominator) and its rate of change. Including these population density 
variables accounts for the impact of endogenous fertility on human capital (e.g. Galor & Weil, 
2000) and for such phenomena as the demographic dividend (Bloom, Canning & Sevilla, 2003a). 
Because of the devastating impact of AIDS in some very specific regions, a control for HIV was 
included, a dummy indicating countries for which more than 10% of the adult population was 
HIV positive in 2001 according to UNAIDS (2008). These countries are Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
                                                           
4 Trade is the sum of exports and imports as proportions of income. Although these are quite different variables from 
the technological point of view, they are collinear. For this reason I keep to the variable used more commonly, trade. 6 
 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
3.  Descriptive analysis of the evolution of the HDI components, 1970-2005 
The  first descriptive analysis is an inspection of the evolution of the mean and dispersion 
(specifically, the standard deviation) of the component indicators of human development as well 
as urbanization, exports, imports, executive constraints and democracy by groups of countries. 
These groups are defined to represent human development or income levels. The evolution of the 
mean reflects on improvement across time, while the evolution of dispersion reflects on the 
presence of σ-convergence or divergence. This is the technique used by Grier and Grier’s (2007) 
evaluation of the neoclassical model, which excels for its simplicity.  
The second descriptive analysis is an examination of decade phase diagrams of the HDI 
components showing all countries together with trend lines for their groups. This is a way of 
visually inspecting the Gray and Purser (2009) data for specific periods of time. 
 
3.1  Mean and dispersion of HDI components across country groups 
The groups of countries are defined according to initial data as follows. I took the 111 countries 
for which the HDI index is defined in the Gray and Purser (2009) data over the years 1970-2005, 
divided  these  into groups of 28 countries, except for the top group which is 27 countries, 
according to either log GDP per capita in 1970 or the HDI index in 1970. I therefore defined 
higher, upper middle, lower middle and lower income or HDI countries. On occasion the 
regional classification of countries used by the World Bank is used instead.  7 
 
As it happens, literacy is the variable that most closely follows the paradigm of absolute 
convergence. This is because the proportion of the population that can be literate has a natural 
upper bound (the whole population, actually 0.99 in our database), and because one of the factors 
of production of this good–teachers–consists of literate people themselves, independently of their 
level of income. The good itself–literacy–is not subject to much technological change, and fairly 
high levels of literacy have been obtained by many less developed countries. Between 1970 and 
2005 mean literacy for the 111 countries increased from 0.62 to 0.83 and the standard deviation 
decreased almost linearly from 0.30 to 0.18. Even so, there is one difference with the usual 
paradigm, and this is that the initial phase of literacy growth is divergent.  
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the trajectories of mean and standard deviation for four groups 
of countries, defined according to income or human development levels. Each trajectory consists 
of eight points corresponding to the quinquennial series 1970-2005, that shift towards the right 
unless otherwise indicated. It can be observed that once mean literacy reaches a level of 
approximately 0.5, the dispersion of literacy across both income and human development groups 
diminishes as group mean literacy increases. Also, the value mean literacy tends to converge to 
is common across groups: the maximum possible value, when all of the population is literate. 
These trajectories are most clearly distinct across human development groups, showing this 
grouping defines the dynamic of the variable itself better than the income grouping.  
So far, this describes absolute convergence. However, the initial segments of the 
trajectories traversed by the lowest income or human development groups, when literacy is less 
than approximately 0.5, follow  divergent trajectories, since as literacy increases so does its 
dispersion. This shows that literacy growth takes off in different countries at different times.  8 
 
The two qualitatively different segments of the trajectories, first divergence and then 
convergence, together constitute a transition, in this case from illiteracy to literacy. 
Let us now turn to log per capita GDP. In this case both the mean and standard deviation 
across the 111 countries increased, from 8.2 to 8.7, and from 1.27 to 1.41 respectively. However, 
a closer look shows Figures 2.1 is consistent with a long-term transition in income for the three 
highest groups, while the bottom group is trapped. The mean is not marked by improvement. 
Figure 2.2 also shows the bottom group trapped, but this time the top groups form a convergence 
club pattern, the top group apparently converging to a higher equilibrium, as the linear trend 
lines show. These conclusions are consistent with other well-known research. Quah (1996) finds 
evidence for a twin-peaked distribution. Bloom, Canning & Sevilla (2003b), find evidence for an 
income poverty trap. Castellacci (2006, 2008) finds evidence for three technology convergence 
clubs consistent with the theory in Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). Mayer-Foulkes (2006) 
finds evidence for three convergence clubs with divergence as well as transitions between them. 
Life expectancy shows a somewhat different evolution to per capita income or literacy. 
Mean life expectancy across the 111 countries increased from 58 to 68 years, while the standard 
deviation went from 10.1 to 11.1, partly because of the increasing life expectancy at the top end 
of the spectrum. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 shows a transition in which countries are eventually tending 
to similar life expectancy levels. If only the first five points of each trajectory are considered, 
from 1970 to 1990, the diagrams a transition ending with a convergence almost as sharp as for 
literacy.  The transition is clearest by human development groups. However, around 1990 
dispersion begins increasing in the three lower groups. Also, human development groups 1 and 2 
have experienced a consistent increase in life expectancy since 1995, without an increase in 
dispersion. This changing pattern from convergence to divergence is documented in a series of 9 
 
works.  Moser, Shkolnikov & Leon (2005)  show that life expectancy divergence replaced 
convergence in the late 1980’s because of adult mortality differences. These results are supported 
by McMichael et al (2004). A trend from convergence to divergence in the late 20th century is 
also noted by Taylor (2009). Ram (2006) shows that, instead of the sharp convergence before the 
1980’s,  after 1980 there is lack of convergence and an indication of “divergence,”  that  is 
particularly marked during the 1990s. Also noted is substantial heterogeneity across the top and 
the bottom quartiles within each period. Increases in world life span inequality are also noted by 
Edwards (2010).  
Gross enrolment ratios represent the proportion of the schooling age population enrolled 
in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the evolution of these 
rates across time and across country groups. Because schooling follows discrete stages, 
enrolment ratios increase by waves across time. This is most clearly seen by income groups. 
Apparently higher education levels are undertaken when income resources permit, and when this 
occurs, a rise in dispersion follows. 19 out of 31 human development group 1 countries had 
reached enrolment ratios above 0.9 by 2005. The mean gross enrolment rate across the 111 
countries is somewhat meaningless. It increased from 0.49 to 0.72, while the standard deviation 
fluctuated from 0.20 down 0.18 and then back to 0.19.  
 
3.2  Decade phase diagrams for the evolution of HDI components across country groups 
A closer examination of the evolution of HDI components across country groups is provided by 
decade phase diagrams that show levels of some indicator on the x axis and its change across a 
decade on the y axis.  10 
 
We begin again with literacy, because it illustrates a transition that begins with a period 
of divergence and ends with absolute convergence. Figure 5.1 shows decade phase diagrams 
across regional country groups beginning  in 1970,  Figure  5.2 beginning in 1995. The 1970 
diagram shows Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia in the initial divergent stage of the literacy 
transition, with the rest of the regions already converging towards a literacy rate of 1. By 1995 
all of the regions had reached the convergent phase of the transition.  
Log per capita income follows quite a complex process. Figure 6.1 illustrates income 
growth from 1980 to 1990 across income groups. Here the higher income group is divided into 
OECD and non-OECD countries. All of the groups except for the OECD countries are following 
a pattern of club convergence, while higher OECD countries appear to be experiencing a new 
phase of growth. This coincides with the initial phase of the wave of globalization that begun in 
the 1990’s. Ten years later, in 1990 (Figure 6.2), all groups of countries are growing towards 
higher  equilibriums, especially the non-OECD higher income group, which exhibits some 
divergence, but also the lowest income group. The full pattern is one of a sequence of transitions 
that begin with a divergent phase and then follow a convergent pattern that might exhibit club 
convergence or delayed entrance into later transitions.  
Figure 7.1, a life expectancy phase diagram for the 1970 to 1980 decade across 
geographical regions, shows a typical transition pattern. However, the most advanced regions are 
converging towards higher levels of life expectancy. By 1995, though (Figure 7.2) Sub Saharan 
Africa had experienced a life expectancy disaster (due to HIV and war). It was now converging 
towards a life expectancy level of only 55 years. Meanwhile South Asia was experiencing a new 
spurt of transition in life expectancy. 11 
 
A similar pattern occurred for the gross enrolment ratio. Figure 8.1 shows for the decade 
beginning in 1970 a convergent pattern for gross enrolment to levels of 0.8, except for 
divergence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and convergence to very low levels in South 
Asia. By the decade beginning 1995  (Figure 8.2)  Western Europe and North America, East 
Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and Caribbean have completed transition phases 
and are now converging to higher equilibriums. Meanwhile East Asia Pacific, Middle East and 
North Africa, and South Asia are entering transitional phases with lower initial levels.  
Figure 8 shows Sub Saharan Africa’s life expectancy evolution over the full period 1970-
1995 in more detail. The decades beginning 1970, 1975 and 1980 show divergent transitional 
phases. 1985, 1990 and 1995 instead  show convergent phases, towards  lower levels of 
dispersion, but also to lower steady state levels falling to 53 years in 1990 and then rising to 55 
in 1995. Some countries display 15 years loses in life expectancy in the decade beginning 1995.  
 
3.3  Mean and dispersion of the main explanatory variables 
We  now conduct a descriptive analysis of our main explanatory variables. One of the 
motivations is to see whether these variables offer particularly striking instances of divergence or 
convergence. We consider the evolution of the mean and dispersion of urbanization, exports, 
imports, executive constraints  and  democracy  in the same way as we did for the human 
development indicators.  
Figure 9.1 shows a surprisingly intimate relation between urbanization and income levels. 
The trajectories of urbanization across lower and middle income groups form an almost perfectly 
integrated common trajectory of increasing means and standard deviations. Meanwhile, the 
higher income group also increased its urbanization rate, but at a lower level of dispersion 12 
 
between countries, perhaps because urbanization started much longer ago in this group. The 
same pattern is shown when this data is examined across human development groups (Figure 
9.2) except that the lower middle human development group had relatively higher levels of 
urbanization, and the higher human development group decreased its dispersion in urbanization. 
Mean urbanization across the 111 countries increased from 0.42 to 0.56, dispersion increasing 
slightly from 0.24 to 0.56. 
Figures 10.1 and 10.2 shows a relation between income or human development levels and 
exports (as a proportion of income). Essentially, the dynamics correspond to the divergent phase 
of a long-term transition to higher levels of integration. However, looking at the trend lines, 
groups 1 and 3 are diverging faster, perhaps  undergoing faster transitions. These groups of 
countries  may be more intensely involved in globalization, representing the typical FDI 
partnership. Mean export rates across the 111 countries increased from 0.25 to 0.42, dispersion 
also increasing from 0.18 to 0.28.  
Imports (Figures 11.1 and 11.2) show a similar pattern to exports. Mean import rates 
across all countries increased from 0.27 to 0.45, while dispersion increased from 0.16 to 0.25. 
The main institutional variables we use are executive constraints and democracy from the 
Politi IV database. Figures 12.1 and 12.2 show the evolution  of executive constraints. This 
follows a typical transitional pattern, with low mean and dispersion levels for low development, 
followed by increasing levels of both means and dispersions and then finally by a convergence 
trend toward high levels of executive constraints. The trajectories are not smooth and show quite 
a bit of variation. Mean executive constraints rises across the 111 countries from 3.33 to 5.25, the 
standard deviation increasing from 2.04 to 2.55. 13 
 
A similar pattern of transition is found for democracy in Figures 13.1 and 13.2. From 
1975 to 2005 the mean across the 111 countries rises  from  1.89  to  3.58 and  the standard 
deviation from 3.97 to 4.17. 
In contrast to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002, 2005), who propose  that the 
critical feature of success in development had been the quality of the institutional framework 
inherited since colonial times, which they consider to be for all intents and purposes fixed across 
time, both executive constraints and democracy are clearly following a transition. Approximately 
three fourths of all countries are still in the divergent phase, with only the top fourth beginning to 
converge. It is illustrative to note that the case of literacy is the reverse: the bottom fourth is still 
in the divergent phase of the transition, while the top three fourths are in the convergent phase.  
Summarizing, the main feature revealed by the descriptive analysis is that human 
development, as well as its determinants, follow a series of superposed transitions that first take 
off with increasing divergence and then converge to a higher equilibrium. This very fundamental 
feature of development is almost completely missing in most theoretical models on economic 
growth. It could be said that vicious cycles keep transitions from beginning. Once they begin, 
they are characterized by virtuous cycles that reach a higher equilibrium. 
 
4.  Decomposition of the convergence coefficient 
The descriptive exploration has shown that the evolution of the HDI components is characterized 
by a complex pattern of convergence and divergence. It consists of a series of superposed 
transitions that first take off with increasing divergence and then converge, smoothly in some 
exceptional cases and exhibiting more complexity and turbulence in others. Also, a series of 14 
 
events such as HIV, war, globalization, or regime changes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
India, China, and so on, strongly affect the course of this evolution. 
In what follows we carry out an econometric analysis to investigate whether some causal 
variables are particularly related to convergence or divergence.  
 
4.1  Estimation 
One way of investigating convergence and divergence is to introduce interaction terms in the 
convergence term in regressions on the rate of growth, of income for example. Here we extend 
this method, used for example in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), as follows.  
I consider that utility is approximately linear in life expectancy, literacy and enrolment 
ratios, only per capita income needing to be considered as a logarithm. Thus in his section when 
we talk about HDI components log per capita income stands in place of per capita income.  
The convergence decomposition estimates are the following. For each HDI component 
consider the convergence decomposition regression 
 
where  index  t  over periods  1970, 1975, … , 2000  and  index  i  ranges over 85  countries 
constituting a balanced panel (the explanatory variables do not cover the 111 countries). Here 
  are  the explanatory variables to be instrumented, including the HDI components. The 
convergence coefficient is decomposed as  . It is necessary to include the independent 
terms   so as not to introduce omitted variable bias. We include a very limited number of 
controls   that are not interacted with the convergence term, specifically the AIDS dummy, and 
the physical geography variables landlocked, tropical and latitude. These are therefore 15 
 
considered to have level but not growth effects
5.   are time period dummies
6
These regressions are evaluated simultaneously  using 3SLS, and individually using 
clustered errors. Explanatory variables   are instrumented using the instruments listed in the 
data section. Exogenous variables   of course intervene in the first stage regressions
. ujt 
are the stochastic terms. Finally   are the coefficients. 
7
The only instruments providing variation across time are the period dummies. In a sense 
the panel estimates therefore provide an enriched cross section. For this reason it is to be 
expected that the error structure is clustered, showing correlation across time for each country. 
Clustered errors turn out to be the best estimates because the instrument set satisfies the 
Hausman and Sargan tests in this case. It also turns out that the 3SLS estimate results are not 
very different when the regressions for the HDI components are evaluated individually or  
simultaneously. 
. Inclusion 
of the quadratic interactions of the instruments is justified not only on the grounds mentioned 
above that the impacts of the various instruments can vary across geographic regions (these are 
also historical correlates), but also because the presence of the quadratic interaction terms of the 
independent variables calls for them. At the same time these interactions serve to augment the 
instrument set’s dimension, allowing the simultaneous instrumentation of variables  , each of 
which can be considered endogenous.  
 
4.2  Results 
                                                           
5 When the physical geography variables were interacted the 3SLS estimation did not converge. 
6 The quinquennial fixed effects can be thought to include the technological leading edge in the HDI component 
being evaluated (see Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). 
7 The AIDS dummy defines a contiguous region that approximately coincides with the region south of the 18th 
southern parallel in Africa. I consider that the social and geographic conditions that established this region as a 
contagion basin for AIDS already existed in 1970, and therefore consider the AIDS dummy to be exogenous. 16 
 
For reference, Table 2 shows the results for the usual absolute convergence regressions using 
OLS, 3SLS and clustered error IV estimates. The instruments used are the full set of instruments. 
The results change considerably. While log GDP per capita is consistently divergent, the other 
HDI components appear to converge in the OLS case. However, only literacy is consistently 
convergent. Life expectancy becomes ambiguous when instrumented, while the IV clustered 
error estimates for gross enrolment ratio yields divergence.  
Our results on absolute  convergence/divergence  are supported by diverse research. 
Results on income divergence and on life expectancy convergence turning to divergence were 
already mentioned above (Bloom, Canning & Sevilla, 2003b; Castellacci, 2006, 2008; Mayer-
Foulkes, 2006; Moser, Shkolnikov & Leon, 2005; McMichael et al, 2004; Taylor, 2009; Ram, 
2006; Edwards, 2010). 
We turn now to the 3SLS and clustered error IV estimates. We examine whether the 
instrument set is weak in the sense that it is only indirectly related to the variables. Staiger & 
Stock (1997) develop an asymptotic distribution theory for instrumental variables regressions 
when the partial correlations between the instruments and the endogenous variables are close to 
zero. According to this study, F values above 10 obtained for the instrument sets in the first stage 
regressions imply acceptable modeling of the endogenous variables by the instruments. Table 3.1 
shows that most of the independent variables achieve these levels of significance. Explanatory 
variables passing the weak instrument test are the HDI components themselves, urban, trade, 
executive constraints, democracy and population density. Only FDI inflows and outflows, rate of 
change of population density, inflation and risk premium have F values less than 10. These are 
not the main variables of interest and in any case their inclusion serves as controls for the other 
coefficients. Note however that confidence values obtained by these variables in the first stage 17 
 
regressions are all better than 1.3% (Table 3.2), and that the correlation of these independent 
variables with the non-interacted, original instrument set is not that low. Table 4 shows risk 
premium has two and FDI inflows and inflation have three instruments with correlations above 
0.10. FDI outflows and rate of change of population density have 10 such instruments.  
Four sets of regressions were run for each of the 3SLS and clustered error IV methods. 
The  first uses all of the variables. The next three in turn exclude democracy, executive 
constraints and urban. The reason is to examine the considerable interaction between these 
variables. Let us now examine the results of Hausman and Sargan tests
8
Table 6 shows the coefficients of the 3SLS and IV clustered error convergence estimates 
with no independent variable excluded. As can be seen, there is a considerable variation in the 
pattern of significance and in the magnitude of the coefficients, implying that the biases 
introduced by error correlations are significant. The number of observations is 581 instead of 595 
because trade data is missing for Cyprus, Jordan and Mauritius in 1970; Ethiopia, Mozambique 
and Panama in 1970 and 1975; Liberia in 1990 and Tanzania in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. 
 for each of these runs in 
Table 5. In the case of 3SLS, the Hausman test fails for log GDP per capita and life expectancy, 
while the Sargan test fails for literacy and gross enrolment ratios. In the case of clustered errors 
IV both tests are successful in every case, except the Sargan test when urban is excluded. This 
strengthens our result on the robustness of the overall significance of the urban variable.  
Table 7 shows the signs and significance pattern of the interacted coefficients and the 
non-interacted control variables. (The significance of the linear terms for explanatory variables 
that also appear interacted is not too relevant on its own.) The fact that the regressions are fully 
                                                           
8 The Hausman test first runs simultaneous OLS regressions instead of the simultaneous 3SLS regressions, and then 
an F test for the joint significance of the coefficients of the simultaneous OLS regression of these residuals on the 
full instrument set (including interacted terms). The Sargan test instead regresses the residuals of the simultaneous 
3SLS regressions on the full instrument set and runs an F test on their joint significance. These tests are similarly 
applied to the individual clustered error IV regressions.  18 
 
instrumented implies that the results are congruent with causal analysis. However, what really 
happening in the estimates is that a space of causes is being assigned according to correlation 
strengths. In so far as we believe that the set of independent variables do in fact proxy for causal 
factors, when a variable obtains significant coefficients this means it is significantly correlated 
with the causes, more significantly than other variables. While this may seem to be a weak 
causality statement, that is precisely what one means by statements such as “trade is an ultimate 
cause of economic growth”. This means that such processes as learning, technological change, 
competition, and so on are especially connected with trade, or “trade is significantly correlated 
with the causal factors of economic growth”. Similarly, urbanization is correlated with making 
living arrangements around modern production facilities and returns to scale or agglomeration 
externalities in education, health and production.  
In this sense, log GDP per capita is a robust factor of convergence for all HDI 
components. This means that it has decreasing returns. Its highest growth impact is at low levels 
of the HDI components. Literacy, by contrast is a divergence factor for income (except when 
urban is excluded) and life expectancy. This means that below a certain threshold lack of literacy 
causes backwardness, and above that threshold it has increasing returns. Its results for literacy 
and gross enrolment ratios  interact with democracy, executive  constraints and urban. Gross 
enrolment ratio contributes to convergence in literacy. Urban is a robustly significant factor of 
divergence for all four HDI components. On the other hand, when it is omitted the significance 
pattern of the remaining variables is altered significantly, especially for income and enrolment 
rate but also for literacy and life expectancy. Trade only gives significant, divergent, results for 
the gross enrolment ratio. Executive constraints yield income convergence so long as democracy 
is included, and robust divergence  in the case of literacy.  Its omission alters results for 19 
 
democracy and other variables. Democracy yields divergence in incomes so long as executive 
constraints are included, and divergence in enrolment ratios so long as urban is included. Its 
omission alters results for executive constraints and other variables. FDI inflows are a factor of 
convergence in literacy and enrolment ratios. FDI outflows are a factor of divergence in life 
expectancy and gross enrolment ratio and of convergence in literacy. Population density is a 
factor of divergence in life expectancy and convergence in enrolment rates. Population density 
growth is only significant when urban is excluded. Low risk premiums, (correcting for its 
negative quality by changing the signs) contribute to convergence in literacy and divergence in 
enrolment rates. Similarly, low inflation contributes to divergence in life expectancy, literacy and 
enrolment rates. 
Turning to non-interacted controls, AIDS decreases life expectancy and increases GDP 
per capita (through mortality). Landlocked reduces income and life expectancy somewhat 
significantly, when no variables are omitted. Tropical reduces GDP and literacy.  Latitude 
increases income, life expectancy and literacy but reduces the enrolment ratio. 
The results depend considerably on the set of independent variables. Nevertheless, one 
noteworthy result is that the correlation of urbanization with causal factors of economic and 
human development is robustly significant, and has increasing returns.  
 
5.  Quantile regressions 
As mentioned in the discussion on divergence and convergence, we are interested in knowing 
what impact different variables have on economic performance at different levels of income. A 
quantile regression is therefore attractive. However, to choose the quantiles according to the 
levels of the human development components, it is necessary for these variables also to be the 20 
 
dependent variables. This is possible if we conduct a levels rather than growth estimate. Also, we 
need to instrument the independent variables so that we can estimate each of the components in 
terms of the others as well as all of the independent variables. The quantile levels we consider 
are 0.1 to 0.9. We include the time dummies only as instruments and not as controls because the 
quantile regressions do not converge when they are included, there probably are already too 
many constants  in the estimates,  one for each quantile  level.  Explanatory variables  t X   are 
substituted with their predicted values from the first stage of instrumental equations  before 





5.1  Results 
The results are shown in Tables 8.1 to 8.4. There are many significant results and they vary 
considerably at different quantiles. We examine the results graphically in Figures 14.1 to 14.4. 
To do so we plot the coefficients with a higher t value than 1.96 (corresponding to a significance 
of approximately 5%) multiplied by one standard deviation. This measures the impact of a 
change of one standard deviation on the target HDI component.  
This exercise does not include the physical geography variables, which are not subject to 
policy.  However, these variables obtained significant results. Latitude was positive when 
significant for income and life expectancy, and negative for literacy. It was not significant for 
enrolment ratios. Latitude may be embodying omitted variables in technology, colonial history, 
and so on. Landlocked was positive when significant for income, mostly negative for life 
                                                           
9 All of the estimates were carried out with Stata. Each quantile regression was carried out separately. Fifty weighted 
least-squares iterations were estimated before the linear programming iterations were started.  21 
 
expectancy, positive for literacy and negative for enrolment ratios, in somewhat surprising 
results. Tropical was negative when significant for income, life expectancy, and enrolment ratios, 
and positive for literacy. Next come literacy and executive constraints, exhibiting decreasing 
impact with income level. Democracy, FDI inflows and inflation appear with negative signs.  
Figure 14.1 shows the quantile results for income. The variables with most impact are life 
expectancy and urbanization. Interestingly, life expectancy is not only affecting lower but also 
higher income levels. Work on the impact of health on income has previously emphasized the 
impact of health at lower income levels (for a summary see Bloom & Canning, 2008). The 
impacts at higher income levels may be related to transitions in the last 20 years. In contrast, 
urbanization affects middle income levels more strongly, making it a development tool for a 
wide range of underdeveloped countries.  
Figure 14.2  shows the results for life expectancy. Literacy, democracy, income, 
urbanization,  trade,  population  and FDI inflows have a positive impact, while executive 
constraints, population growth, FDI outflows, and risk premium have a negative impact. The 
indicators exhibit a high degree of significance and all of the signs are the expected signs except 
perhaps for executive constraints. While some indicators show decreasing returns, others peak at 
medium high levels of life expectancy, such as urbanization, yet others at the top levels, such as 
enrolment ratios.  
Figure 14.3 shows the results for literacy. Enrolment ratio, life expectancy, FDI outflows, 
and executive constraints are the variables with the most consistent positive impact. Democracy, 
urbanization, trade (for lower levels of literacy) and population growth are the variables with the 
most consistent negative impact.  22 
 
Figure 14.4 shows the results for enrolment ratios. Literacy (for all levels of enrolment), 
urbanization and GDP (at lower levels of enrolment), democracy, population and trade (at 
intermediate levels), life expectancy, FDI outflows and population growth (for higher levels), are 
significant. 
 
6.  Discussion 
6.1  The most significant results 
What have we learned from our analysis? We can start by comparing the results of the two sets 
of estimates. Note that the convergence coefficients represent the marginal growth and the 
quantile estimates the marginal level that each independent variable can provide for each HDI 
component. Table 9 represents the signs and significance of the main coefficients in both sets of 
estimates. In the case of the convergence estimates the preferred run is the clustered error IV, 
with no variable omitted. Our significance measure is the sum of the number of significance stars 
obtained by each variable for each sign. This measure is closely correlated with just counting the 
number of times a variable  is significant in each sign. In the case of quantile regression 
coefficients, we count the number of quantiles each variable was significant for, for each sign.  
We comment on the explanatory variables in the order of their total significance scores. 
Urbanization is the most significant. While it has some negative level effects, it has consistently 
increasing returns to growth (of HDI components). Literacy is always positive for levels and also 
has consistently increasing returns to growth. Income is equally significant, always positive in 
levels but always has  decreasing returns to growth. Next is democracy, with positive and 
negative impact levels, but increasing returns to growth. Executive constraints follows, equally 23 
 
ambiguous in levels, but with some increasing and some decreasing returns to growth. Then 
comes life expectancy, always positive in levels, but with decreasing returns, like income. Trade 
is as significant as life expectancy, ambiguous in levels but with increasing returns. Low 
inflation has ambiguous level effects but increasing returns. FDI inflows also has ambiguous 
level effects but instead decreasing returns. Then come FDI outflows, population density and its 
growth, with ambiguous level and growth effects, although FDI outflows  stands out for 
increasing returns.  
In order of significance, urbanization, low inflation, FDI outflows, literacy and 
democracy stand out for their increasing returns to HDI component growth. This is an aspect of 
growth  that the prevalent emphasis on convergence has missed studying. Similarly  literacy, 
urbanization,  life expectancy, income and  trade, in that order,  stand out  for their positive 
contributions to levels of the HDI components. 
There are several salient results. First is the consistent significance of urban proportion of 
the population. It affects income, literacy and gross enrolment ratio. All of its signs are positive 
and the magnitudes significant except for the literacy quantile estimate. This may be a reflection 
of migrant poverty. Given the consistent impact of cities, it is surprising that they do not impact 
life expectancy significantly. Perhaps they have significant positive and negative effects.  
Once one thinks about it, it is quite reasonable that cities play an important role in 
development, given that modern technologies and life are mainly city based. The reason the 
result is a surprise is that cities do not figure very much in development analysis or policy.  
Another surprise is that trade does not significantly impact income. It does significantly 
affect life expectancy levels. This may work through increasing the availability of myriad cheap 
technologies to improve health, as well as cheap food. It may also complement knowledge 24 
 
channels significantly associated here with life expectancy, such as literacy and gross enrolment 
ratio. Trade is also significantly associated with the gross enrolment ratio and its growth.  
Low inflation is positively associated with income levels and yields increasing returns in 
the other HDI components.  
As far as the set of exogenous variables are concerned, which include the “ultimate 
causes of growth,” economic geography yields far more significant impacts than trade, FDI or 
institutions. This kind of geographic variable is not the kind of physical geography, exogenous 
variable that is included in ultimate causes. Instead, it refers to an important economic feature 
that is not well coordinated by the market system.  
While globalization has had large impacts, see for example Figure 14 showing how 
income divergence (or dispersion) peaks in 1990, its main features, trade and FDI, have not had 
the impact on the HDI components that might have been expected, according to the significance 
patterns found here.  
Another salient result is the ambiguity of the signs obtained by several important 
explanatory variables across HDI components. This raises important questions. Why do 
executive constraints, democracy, trade and FDI inflows and outflows and low inflation have 
such mixed impacts? Are there issues of distribution that muddy the impacts of these 
institutional, openness and macro management variables? The answer to this question might 
yield very productive insights. 
 
6.2  Towards objectivity 
The modern theory of economic growth began with the neoclassical growth model, in some 
sense a paradigm for the belief that markets are sufficient, or at least almost sufficient to direct 25 
 
economic growth. The model assumes that competitive markets will allocate resources in such a 
way as to produce optimal economic growth and economic convergence. Because much of 
international economic life does in fact occur through markets, in evaluating cross-country 
growth the model serves as a benchmark to see whether in fact the model explains growth, or if 
not, what is going wrong.  
For example, Grier and Grier (2007) note that to be consistent with the absolute 
divergence in output levels – which they corroborate is occurring – it would be necessary to 
observe divergence in some of the determinants of income, such as physical and human capital, 
which they do not observe. However, they do observe divergence in technological levels. So this 
is the first point – markets might not distribute technology optimally. 
The neoclassical growth model can fail in two ways. If markets are a sufficient in 
principle, then deficiencies might originate in the context that defines them –  institutions, 
(physical) geography and trade, this last being a basic policy choice. A considerable literature on 
economic growth focuses on these types of causes as the fundamental causes of long-term 
growth. Recently institutions seem to be the favorite of these causes (Rodrik and Subramanian, 
2003; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004).  
Alternatively, markets are insufficient for regulating and coordinating substantial classes 
of economic problems. For example, human capital investment is characterized by market 
failures. Technology is based on market power. Urbanization is based on externalities.  In 
addition, public goods may be important. When such issues are strong enough, deficient market 
equilibriums may arise, corresponding to persistent poverty. The lower equilibriums constitute, 
by definition, traps that markets cannot dissolve.  26 
 
Convergence and divergence are linked with these two possibilities. When markets drive 
growth, convergence forces drive towards a new equilibrium. When markets are insufficient, 
bottlenecks arise that slow growth and generate divergence between countries. When and if the 
bottlenecks are overcome a transition emerges to an at least somewhat higher equilibrium.  
Our descriptive study shows that development consists of a series of such superposed 
transitions that first take off with increasing divergence and then converge to a higher 
equilibrium. The paradigm of smooth growth is inconsistent with the facts. 
The point is that the paradigm is deceptive. The reason is that conceptualizing growth as 
a smooth process makes it appear that it is susceptible to uniform policies. When a transition is 
ripe, it has increasing returns. When it is not, it may be impossible.  
Miracle growth, which ought to be the objective of development policy, is a transition 
from a low to a high steady state (see Wan’s 2004 case histories of East Asia) involving 
transitions in production and in all aspects of economic life. It is not a simple, smooth process. 
Markets will often bump into transitions on their own and carry them forward. However, 
some transitions need public inputs and institutions. Aid programs in particular must recognize 
which the relevant transitions are. 
It is worth noting here that, at least conceptually, institutions fall into two kinds, those 
that simply establish the market system, and those that play an additional economic, political or 
social role. Providing public goods is not the least such role! Objectively, what types of 
institutions are needed when? 
It is of course possible that the market structure itself is impeded, creating a bottleneck, 
but not all bottlenecks are solvable through markets. On the contrary, these barriers have 
traditionally been the direct concern of public policy. The point is to let markets do what they do 27 
 
well and complement what they do not. Western society has done this throughout its capitalist 
history (with all the struggles this involves). 
The discussion of convergence has tended to link with a radical defense of the 
neoclassical growth model. However, what is needed is objectivity. When do markets carry 
forward the growth process, and when do they not? What are the best ways to trigger the 
transitions that are essential to development process? It is clear that well functioning markets are 
a part of this, but claiming they are the whole throws the baby out with the bathwater.  
Our convergence decomposition is a step towards objectivity. It shows that some 
variables contribute to convergence and others to divergence. In turn, the quantile estimates 
show that different variables are important at different levels of development. Moreover, several 
of the crucial variables are not particularly well driven by the market, such as urbanization, life 
expectancy, literacy and democracy. 
 
6.3  Urbanization as an intermediate objective for development 
Urbanization can be a particularly interesting intermediate objective for development for several 
reasons. First, it is necessary. It is part of the development path. Perhaps given modern 
technologies this includes making urban quality and externalities available to rural life. It 
certainly means bringing quality to urban life. Many things go into organizing cities well, such as 
transportation, provision of health and education, assigning areas for living and for industry and 
services, and so on. It requires political and social organization. Also, each city in each context 
will call for particular improvement objectives. These are all elements of a program of 
development. On the other hand they are concrete. A way must also be found for markets to 
determine some of the choices within some framework. Traditionally in underdeveloped 28 
 
countries what has happened is that urbanization has proceeded in a disorganized way that turns 
out to be very costly, governments following behind the facts. 
In so far as urbanization has been important, it is not mainly making markets work better 
that has achieved growth. Instead, it has been achieving the kind of social coordination that is 
successful at creating cities that has obtained additional growth, together with the coordination 
that markets can provide. The importance of this coordination and its institutional aspects is 
illustrated by the interaction we have shown exists between the variables urban, democracy and 
executive constraints. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Our descriptive analysis and estimates show that economic growth and development follow a 
complex pattern of divergence and convergence. This can be thought to consist of a series of 
superposed transitions that first take off with increasing divergence (and increasing returns) and 
then converge.  
Each human development component follows its own set of transitions. These are also 
interlinked, in different ways at different stages. The estimates confirm the complex relations in 
divergence and convergence that exist in these indicators.  
Our estimates include indicators of the “ultimate causes of economic growth,” 
institutions, trade and physical geography. They also include an indicator in economic 
geography, proportion of the urban population. The descriptive analysis has found evidence of 
divergence in the evolution of urbanization, exports and imports (Figures 9, 10, 11). It also found 
strong evidence that executive constraints and democracy follow an endogenous –if more 
complex– transition analogous to other variables such as literacy (Figures 1, 12, 13). 29 
 
The results show that economic geography is more significant to economic and human 
development than either trade or the market-institutional indicators (executive constraints, risk 
premium and inflation), and that, as any variable contributing to divergence, has increasing 
returns to growth. 
There is also evidence that institutional and openness variables such as democracy and 
executive constraints, trade and FDI inflows, have both significantly positive and significantly 
negative impacts. Perhaps this is due to their distributive effects. It may be that policies for 
institutional improvement and openness could be more effective if their  interactions with 
distribution were addressed.  
Meanwhile, improving markets will have smaller returns than complementing them with 
adequate institutions capable of coordinating urbanization and investing in human capital and 
technology. Urbanization itself can provide a concrete agenda for development  addressing 
critical local issues involving all aspects of economic, political and social life as well as human 
development.  
The neoclassical growth paradigm is wrong in another way as well. Economic 
development is not a smooth process. Growth policies depend for their success in identifying a 
set of transitions that a country is ripe for. 
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Figure 1  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of literacy across country groups 
   
Figure 1.1  Across income groups    Figure 1.2  Across human development groups 
 
Figure 2  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of log GDP per capita across country groups 
 
Figure 2.1  Across income groups    Figure 2.2  Across human development groups 































































































































































































Figure 3 Evolution of mean and standard deviation of life expectancy across country groups 
   
Figure 3.1  Across income groups    Figure 3.2  Across human development groups 
 
Figure 4  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of gross enrolment rates across country groups 
   














































































































































































































Figure 5  Decade phase diagrams for the evolution of literacy across regions in 1970 and 1995 
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Figure 6. Decade phase diagram for the evolution of log per capita income across income 
groups in 1980 and 1990 
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Figure 8. Decade phase diagram for the evolution of gross enrolment ratio across income 
regions in 1970 and 1995 
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Figure 8  Decade phase diagram for the evolution of life expectancy in Sub Saharan Africa from 
1970 to 1995 
 
 























































Figure 9  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of urbanization across country groups 
 
Figure 9.1  Across income groups    Figure 9.2  Across human development groups 
 
Figure 10  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of exports across country groups 
   
Figure 10.1  Across income groups    Figure 10.2  Across human development groups 









































































































































































Figure 11  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of imports across country groups 
   
Figure 11.1  Across income groups    Figure 11.2  Across human development groups 
 
Figure 12  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of executive constraints across country groups 
   
Figure 12.1  Across income groups    Figure 12.2  Across human development groups 









































































































































































































Figure 13  Evolution of mean and standard deviation of democracy across country groups 
   
Figure 13.1  Across income groups    Figure 13.2  Across human development groups 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Log GDP  0 4 . 1 1 2 0 . 5 9 2 . 1 6 3 . 8 a t i p a c
Life  8 3 . 1 8 1 1 . 9 2 3 4 . 1 1 6 6 . 2 6 y c n a t c e p x E
9 9 . 0 5 0 . 0 8 2 . 0 9 6 . 0 y c a r e t i L
Gross Enrolment Ratio 0 57 0 21 0 05 1 15
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables
Over the 595 Observation Sample
Gross Enrolment Ratio 0.57 0.21 0.05 1.15
0 2 . 8 9 7 4 . 2 0 3 . 4 2 3 8 . 7 4 n a b r U
6 2 . 2 2 2 6 0 . 8 6 5 . 3 3 3 4 . 1 6 e d a r T
Executive Constraint 3.95 2.63 0 7
0 1 0 1 3 . 4 6 8 . 3 y c a r c o m e D
FDI  9 8 . 2 8 5 . 1 s w o l f n i -5.50 33.51
FDI  7 2 . 1 1 4 . 0 s w o l f t u o -2.72 12.47 out o s 0
Pop Density (Agr) -2.09 1.29 -5.93 0.99
∆ Pop Density (Agr) 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.15
5 2 . 9 6 1 8 3 . 8 2 n o i t a l f n I -3.46 2719.50
Risk  5 9 . 0 1 8 0 . 2 m u i m e r P -1.80 245.23
AIDS  1 0 0 2 . 0 4 0 . 0 y m m u D
1 0 9 3 . 0 9 1 . 0 d e k c o l d n a L
T i l 0 54 0 50 0 1 1 0 0 5 . 0 4 5 . 0 l a c i p o r T
2 9 . 5 2 9 0 . 4 1 e d u t i t a L -36.89 63.89
area (sq.  6 3 7 , 0 6 1 , 9 0 3 4 3 4 3 , 2 3 8 , 1 3 5 7 , 8 9 8 ) . m k
Malaria Ecology Available 0.95 0.21 0 1
Malaria  5 5 . 1 3 0 8 5 . 7 9 2 . 4 y g o l o c E
Ethnic Fractionalization 1960 41.9 30.3 0 93.0
British Legal Orig 1 0 7 4 . 0 3 3 . 0 n i British Legal Origin 0.33 0.47 0 1
French Legal  1 0 0 5 . 0 6 5 . 0 n i g i r O
German Legal Origin 0.05 0.21 0 1
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.06 0.24 0 1
East Asia  1 0 9 2 . 0 9 0 . 0 c i f i c a P
East Europe and Central Asia 0.01 0.11 0 1
Middle East and North Africa 0.12 0.32 0 1
h South  1 0 5 1 . 0 2 0 . 0 a i s A
Western  1 0 7 3 . 0 6 1 . 0 e p o r u E
North  1 0 5 1 . 0 2 0 . 0 a c i r e m A
Sub Saharan  1 0 7 4 . 0 3 3 . 0 a c i r f A
Latin America and Caribbean 0.24 0.42 0 1








Initial Value 0.00320*** -0.00251** -0.0119*** -0.00338**
(0.00107) (0.00120) (0.000641) (0.00166)
Constant -0.0130 0.443*** 0.0143*** 0.00898***
(0.00902) (0.0764) (0.000477) (0.00101)
Observations 595 595 595 595
R-squared 0.015 0.007 0.369 0.007
Initial Value 0.00526*** -0.000145 -0.0129*** 0.000946
(0.00113) (0.00128) (0.000676) (0.00182)
Constant -0.0302*** 0.295*** 0.0150*** 0.00650***
(0.00955) (0.0812) (0.000500) (0.00110)
Observations 595 595 595 595
R-squared 0.009 0.001 0.366 -0.004
Initial Value 0.00564*** -5.67e-05 -0.0139*** 0.00134*
(0.000242) (0.000568) (0.000292) (0.000700)
Constant -0.0336*** 0.288*** 0.0158*** 0.00620***
(0.00242) (0.0413) (0.000219) (0.000479)
Observations 595 595 595 595
R-squared 0.006 0.000 0.358
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




























Table 3.1 F Statistic for Instrument Signiﬁcance in First Stage Regressions
Independent variable
None 80.61 103.60 119.66 71.63 156.74 22.41 15.46 12.31 3.51 6.01 90.81 3.31 1.48 1.55
Log GDP per Capita 74.19 121.26 164.02 97.68 134.12 25.93 22.92 15.18 3.50 5.90 88.33 3.07 1.45 1.60
Life Expectancy 121.26 111.23 159.50 96.08 153.92 26.08 22.50 14.71 3.31 5.86 72.47 2.96 1.45 1.61
Literacy 164.02 159.50 133.11 135.26 166.99 31.20 28.85 15.63 3.25 6.23 66.18 3.12 1.45 1.62
























Table 3.2 P Values for Instrument Signiﬁcance in First Stage Regressions
Independent variable




None 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.004
Log GDP per Capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.002
Life Expectancy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.002
Literacy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.002
























AIDS Dummy -0.16 -0.18 -0.07 -0.03 -0.15 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.05 -0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.02
Landlocked -0.39 -0.44 -0.36 -0.39 -0.44 -0.06 -0.15 -0.14 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 0.09 0.02 0.00
Table 4. Correlation of Independent Variables with Instruments
Over the 595 Observation Sample
Tropical -0.63 -0.59 -0.45 -0.53 -0.60 0.07 -0.35 -0.33 0.07 -0.30 -0.20 0.19 0.05 -0.03
Latitude 0.47 0.41 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.05 0.16 0.18 -0.08 0.33 0.38 -0.16 -0.14 -0.02
Area (sq. km.) 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.23 -0.33 0.16 0.15 -0.05 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.12 0.04
Malaria Ecology Available -0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.18 0.09 0.09 -0.08 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.00
Malaria Ecology -0.58 -0.62 -0.67 -0.66 -0.47 -0.09 -0.34 -0.32 -0.02 -0.16 -0.28 0.18 -0.04 -0.06
Ethnic Fractionalization 1960 -0.51 -0.56 -0.51 -0.49 -0.48 -0.08 -0.23 -0.26 0.02 -0.17 -0.28 0.24 0.00 -0.02
British Legal Origin -0 07 -0 05 0 05 0 02 -0 18 0 21 0 10 0 06 0 21 -0 01 0 00 0 01 -0 06 0 13 British Legal Origin -0.07 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.18 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.13
French Legal Origin -0.20 -0.19 -0.28 -0.23 -0.03 -0.20 -0.25 -0.21 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 0.12 0.08 -0.10
German Legal Origin 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.14 -0.04 0.19 0.17 -0.08 0.11 0.32 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.04 0.15 0.17 -0.02 0.25 0.01 -0.19 -0.03 -0.02
East Asia Paciﬁc 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.09 -0.02 0.12 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.30 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01
East Europe and Central Asia 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.08 0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02
Middle East and North Africa 0.16 0.13 -0.08 0.07 0.17 0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 0.16 0.10 -0.03 0.10
South Asia -0.20 -0.13 -0.19 -0.13 -0.21 -0.17 0.08 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.15 0.05 -0.02 0.01
Western Europe 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.10 0.30 0.34 0.03 0.48 0.17 -0.28 -0.06 -0.04
North America 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.18 -0.11 0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.10 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.00
Sub Saharan Africa -0.70 -0.76 -0.68 -0.67 -0.63 -0.03 -0.36 -0.36 0.00 -0.20 -0.35 0.31 -0.06 -0.04
Latin America and Caribbean 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.14 -0.11 -0.12 0.18 0.01
Num. instrum. with |corr| > 0.1 17 17 15 15 16 7 14 13 3 10 16 10 3 2
45Method Omitted Variable: None Democracy Executive Constraints Urban
3SLS Hausman 0.99998 0.99997 0.99998 0.99998
3SLS Sargan 0.99975 0.98869 0.99685 0.98126
IV cluster Hausman 0.0000374 0.0000516 0.00004335 0.00008158
IV cluster Sargan 0.89126 0.77996 0.81095 0.64304
Method Omitted Variable: None Democracy Executive Constraints Urban
3SLS Hausman 0.99150 0.99163 0.99065 0.97989
3SLS Sargan 0.99999 0.99999 0.99937 0.37794
IV cluster Hausman 0.00000110 0.00000124 0.00000108 0.00000153
IV cluster Sargan 0.9865 0.9854 0.9950 0.9861
Method Omitted Variable: None Democracy Executive Constraints Urban
3SLS Hausman 0.00000110 0.00000124 0.00000108 0.00000153
3SLS Sargan 0.0000374 0.0000516 0.00004335 0.00008158
IV cluster Hausman 0.0000319 0.0000254 0.0000233 3.16E-07
IV cluster Sargan 0.99380 0.99772 0.96142 0.09594
Method Omitted Variable: None Democracy Executive Constraints Urban
3SLS Hausman 0.01020 0.00683 0.00717 0.00815
3SLS Sargan 0.00003193 0.00002537 0.00002327 3.158E-07
IV cluster Hausman 0.000153 0.000132 0.000101 0.000007
IV cluster Sargan 0.97586 0.95704 0.95094 0.85468
Hausman tests with better than 1% signiﬁcance in bold. 
Sargan tests with worse that 60% signiﬁcance in bold.





Table 5. P Values of Hausman and Sargan Tests
46IV 3SLS IV 3SLS IV 3SLS IV 3SLS
Variable Dependiente 
















-0.0113*** -0.0130** -0.00613** -0.0109* -0.00476*** -0.00163 -0.0202*** -0.0204**
(0.00221) (0.00524) (0.00250) (0.00623) (0.00111) (0.00250) (0.00313) (0.00885)
-0 000253 -0 000541 0 000176 -0 000306 -0 000410*** -0 000580 -0 000412 -0 000232
Table 6. Coeﬃcients of 3SLS and Clustered Error IV Convergence Estimates
No independent variable omitted
Dep Var X Log GDP per 
Capita
-0.000253 -0.000541 0.000176 -0.000306 -0.000410*** -0.000580 -0.000412 -0.000232
(0.000187) (0.000634) (0.000225) (0.000597) (0.000159) (0.000395) (0.000391) (0.00107)
0.0342*** 0.0380 0.0194* 0.0548* -0.0116 -0.0219 0.0295* 0.0157
(0.0106) (0.0232) (0.0109) (0.0294) (0.00719) (0.0142) (0.0160) (0.0415)
0.00137 -0.00478 0.00422 2.04e-05 -0.0454*** -0.0487*** -0.00636 0.0285
(0.0117) (0.0318) (0.0151) (0.0381) (0.00839) (0.0180) (0.0236) (0.0632)
0.000288*** 0.000441** -3.56e-06 8.43e-05 0.000482*** 0.000500*** 0.000679*** 0.000632
(6.99e-05) (0.000203) (9.89e-05) (0.000265) (7.35e-05) (0.000129) (9.59e-05) (0.000386)
6.14e-05 0.000137 1.48e-05 0.000122 -7.26e-06 2.57e-05 0.000196*** 0.000139
Dep Var X Life Expectancy
Dep Var X Literacy
Dep Var X Gross Enrolment 
Ratio
Dep Var X Urban
6.14e-05 0.000137 1.48e-05 0.000122 -7.26e-06 2.57e-05 0.000196 0.000139
(4.02e-05) (0.000111) (4.95e-05) (0.000126) (2.91e-05) (6.55e-05) (6.23e-05) (0.000171)
-0.00487*** -0.00514 -2.82e-05 -0.000495 0.00208** 0.00168 -0.00245 -0.000269
(0.00145) (0.00316) (0.00188) (0.00331) (0.000888) (0.00150) (0.00242) (0.00515)
0.00395*** 0.00485* -0.00190 0.000754 -0.000784 -0.000180 0.00373* 0.000629
(0.00116) (0.00250) (0.00180) (0.00283) (0.000703) (0.00137) (0.00195) (0.00430)
-4.25e-05 -0.00151 0.00192 0.000885 -0.000949* -0.00108 -0.00676*** -0.00569**
(0.000796) (0.00223) (0.00118) (0.00204) (0.000554) (0.000855) (0.00158) (0.00274)
-0.00274 -0.0148 0.0340*** 0.0261* -0.0313*** -0.0365*** 0.00939*** 0.0121
Dep Var X Executive 
Constraint
Dep Var X Democracy
Dep Var X FDI inﬂows
D V X FDI tfl
Dep Var X Trade
0.00274 0.0148 0.0340 0.0261 0.0313 0.0365 0.00939 0.0121
(0.00361) (0.0129) (0.00695) (0.0151) (0.00862) (0.0142) (0.00248) (0.00987)
-0.000529 -0.00109 0.00115** -0.000499 0.000514 0.00112 -0.00280*** -0.00346
(0.000600) (0.00153) (0.000572) (0.00188) (0.000493) (0.000873) (0.000858) (0.00256)
0.0800 0.183 0.261 0.361 -0.0497 -0.0354 -0.178 -0.116
(0.115) (0.279) (0.159) (0.281) (0.0546) (0.112) (0.145) (0.317)
0.000379 0.000445 0.000353 0.000485 0.000621* 0.000644 -0.00176*** -0.000650
(0.000272) (0.000618) (0.000399) (0.000743) (0.000347) (0.000459) (0.000548) (0.00128)
-4.46e-05 -3.57e-05 -5.03e-05*** -7.60e-05* -3.28e-05*** -1.60e-05 -0.000105*** -8.73e-05
Dep Var X Risk Premium
Dep Var X Inﬂation
Dep Var X FDI outflows
Dep Var X Pop Density in 
Agr Land (log)
Dep Var X Pop Density 
Growth
(3.86e-05) (5.42e-05) (1.25e-05) (4.29e-05) (9.24e-06) (3.37e-05) (1.12e-05) (7.31e-05)
0.160*** 0.196*** 0.311** 0.626 0.00535*** 0.00305 0.0130*** 0.0128**
(0.0270) (0.0642) (0.155) (0.397) (0.000968) (0.00198) (0.00166) (0.00538)
0.00284* 0.00533 0.0224 0.0756 0.000177* 0.000241 0.000388* 0.000333
(0.00146) (0.00492) (0.0192) (0.0582) (9.61e-05) (0.000239) (0.000208) (0.000526)
-0.238*** -0.268 -1.702*** -3.571** 0.0667*** 0.0650*** -0.0327*** -0.0197
(0.0875) (0.186) (0.638) (1.805) (0.00822) (0.0161) (0.00849) (0.0227)
-0.0501 -0.00274 0.266 0.419 0.0333*** 0.0380*** 0.147*** 0.102
Dep Var X Inﬂation




(0.106) (0.271) (1.003) (2.470) (0.00682) (0.0138) (0.0193) (0.0677)
-0.00262*** -0.00399** 0.000563 -0.00496 -0.000430***-0.000452***-0.000452*** -0.000416*
(0.000638) (0.00181) (0.00681) (0.0176) (6.68e-05) (0.000108) (6.30e-05) (0.000247)
-0.000457 -0.00117 -0.00192 -0.00903 3.89e-06 -1.95e-05 -0.000144*** -0.000112
(0.000379) (0.000999) (0.00339) (0.00864) (2.58e-05) (5.70e-05) (4.51e-05) (0.000116)
Standard errors in parentheses, period dummies not shown




47IV 3SLS IV 3SLS IV 3SLS IV 3SLS
Variable Dependiente 
















0.0399*** 0.0411 0.0260 0.0425 -0.00188** -0.00178* 0.000108 -0.000886
(0.0124) (0.0266) (0.118) (0.212) (0.000801) (0.00107) (0.00136) (0.00294)
-0 0321*** -0 0395* 0 110 -0 0683 0 000560 0 000213 -0 00137 0 000323
Table 6. Coeﬃcients of 3SLS and Clustered Error IV Convergence Estimates (continued)
No independent variable excluded
Executive Constraint
-0.0321*** -0.0395* 0.110 -0.0683 0.000560 0.000213 -0.00137 0.000323
(0.00976) (0.0208) (0.116) (0.184) (0.000609) (0.000959) (0.00110) (0.00250)
0.00127 0.0141 -0.125 -0.0646 0.00122** 0.00136** 0.00348*** 0.00307*
(0.00692) (0.0187) (0.0791) (0.126) (0.000496) (0.000674) (0.000989) (0.00158)
0.0244 0.148 -2.635*** -2.052* 0.0308*** 0.0358** -0.00655*** -0.00873
(0.0372) (0.132) (0.536) (1.161) (0.00852) (0.0140) (0.00210) (0.00839)
0.00607 0.0121 -0.0568 0.0659 -0.000212 -0.000781 0.00201*** 0.00264
(0.00557) (0.0136) (0.0391) (0.127) (0.000436) (0.000717) (0.000591) (0.00168)
-0.460 -1.403 -15.33 -21.22 0.0268 0.0209 -0.0401 -0.0419
Pop Density in Agr Land 
(log)




-0.460 -1.403 -15.33 -21.22 0.0268 0.0209 -0.0401 -0.0419
(0.966) (2.257) (9.963) (17.13) (0.0420) (0.0757) (0.0880) (0.178)
0.000403 0.000330 0.00360*** 0.00542* 3.04e-05*** 1.55e-05 7.76e-05*** 6.63e-05
(0.000314) (0.000463) (0.000831) (0.00280) (7.86e-06) (2.83e-05) (8.88e-06) (5.32e-05)
-0.00405 -0.00470 -0.0294 -0.0408 -0.000577* -0.000607 0.00131*** 0.000474
(0.00260) (0.00582) (0.0296) (0.0542) (0.000320) (0.000417) (0.000404) (0.000951)
0.0233*** 0.0508*** -0.410*** 0.0451 -0.00108 -0.00510*** -0.00111 0.00299
(0.00722) (0.0142) (0.0898) (0.166) (0.000798) (0.00180) (0.00123) (0.00383)
-0.00378** -0.00384 -0.0565* -0.0694 -0.000208 0.000283 -7.01e-05 0.000306





L dl k d
0.00378 0.00384 0.0565 0.0694 0.000208 0.000283 7.01e 05 0.000306
(0.00175) (0.00617) (0.0310) (0.0654) (0.000335) (0.000727) (0.000704) (0.00149)
-0.0110*** -0.00444 -0.0118 -0.0143 -0.00117*** -0.00190*** 0.000218 -0.000467
(0.00245) (0.00574) (0.0246) (0.0590) (0.000264) (0.000696) (0.000610) (0.00138)
0.000119*** 0.000173 0.000648* 0.00117 1.14e-05*** 1.11e-05 -3.18e-05*** -2.59e-05
(3.83e-05) (0.000107) (0.000365) (0.00107) (2.88e-06) (1.20e-05) (1.10e-05) (2.63e-05)
-0.0160*** -0.0182 0.104*** 0.0911 -2.06e-05 -0.000759 -0.00294** -0.00246
(0.00576) (0.0128) (0.0380) (0.120) (0.000566) (0.00161) (0.00116) (0.00281)






(0.00573) (0.0131) (0.0379) (0.123) (0.000594) (0.00160) (0.00140) (0.00291)
-0.0276*** -0.0300** -0.0812 -0.0807 0.00123* 0.00163 -0.00699*** -0.00576**
(0.00586) (0.0125) (0.0593) (0.118) (0.000630) (0.00154) (0.00141) (0.00279)
-0.0222*** -0.0287** -0.106** -0.119 0.00122* 0.00142 -0.00138 -0.000402
(0.00656) (0.0128) (0.0508) (0.121) (0.000641) (0.00162) (0.00137) (0.00280)
-0.000493 -0.00980 -0.0382 -0.0174 0.00304*** 0.00266 6.64e-05 0.000645
(0.00750) (0.0133) (0.0653) (0.130) (0.000640) (0.00168) (0.00141) (0.00294)






(0.00614) (0.0150) (0.0664) (0.150) (0.000861) (0.00185) (0.00179) (0.00331)
-0.563*** -0.734*** -1.032 -2.721 -0.0383*** -0.0278** -0.0716*** -0.0632**
(0.0844) (0.240) (0.842) (2.410) (0.00531) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0321)
Standard errors in parentheses, period dummies not shown




Log GDP per Capita (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)** (-)** (-)** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)***
Life Expectancy (-)*** (-)*** (-)***
Literacy (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)** (-)** (-)*** (+)*
Log GDP per Capita Life Expectancy Literacy Gross Enrolment Ratio
Table 7.  Sign and Signiﬁcance Patterns for Coeﬃcients of Clustered Error IV Convergence Estimates
Omitted Variables Marked in Gray
y ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Gross Enrolment Ratio ( * * * ) + ( -)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)***
Urban * * * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * * ) + (
Trade (+)*** (+)* (+)** (+)***
Executive Constraint (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*
Democracy (+)*** (+)*** (- * * ) + ( * ) + ( * * * ) + ( * * )
FDI inﬂows (+)* (+)** (+)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)** ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
FDI outflows (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)**
Pop Density in Agr Land (log) (-)** (+)** (+)** (+)* (+)** (+)** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)***
Pop Density Growth (+)*** (+)** (+)* (-)* (-)** (-)* (-)* (-)
Risk Premium ( * * ) + ( * ) + ( * * ) + ( * * ) + ( * * ) + ( -)*** (-)** (-)** (-)***
Inﬂation (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)***
Non-Interacted Controls
AIDS dummy (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (- ( * * * ) -)
Landlocked (- ( * * ) -)* (- * * ) + ( * * )
Tropical (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (- ( * * * ) -)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (+)*
Latitude (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)* (+)** (+)* (+)** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)* (-)*** (-)** (-)** (-)***
Signiﬁcance indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
49q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60* q70 q80 q90
0.0551*** 0.0438*** 0.0353*** 0.0369*** 0.0407*** 0.0348*** 0.0442*** 0.0495*** 0.0542***
(0.00677) (0.00790) (0.00885) (0.00615) (0.00576) (0.00576) (0.00672) (0.00920) (0.0114)
1.225*** 1.076*** 0.878*** 0.984*** 0.795*** 0.797*** 0.603*** 0.517** 0.779***
(0.292) (0.302) (0.328) (0.226) (0.204) (0.193) (0.212) (0.259) (0.292)
-0.976** -0.514 -0.266 -0.0562 0.0777 0.155 0.583* 1.232*** 0.705
(0.412) (0.416) (0.475) (0.330) (0.307) (0.295) (0.329) (0.434) (0.480)
0.0163*** 0.0186*** 0.0209*** 0.0185*** 0.0208*** 0.0225*** 0.0184*** 0.0116*** 0.00584
(0.00198) (0.00212) (0.00228) (0.00163) (0.00156) (0.00157) (0.00188) (0.00278) (0.00375)
-0.00173** 0.000368 0.00244** 0.000760 0.000883 0.00113 0.00121 0.00198 0.00400**
(0.000875) (0.00105) (0.00111) (0.000784) (0.000763) (0.000771) (0.000892) (0.00125) (0.00155)
0.143*** 0.102*** 0.0875*** 0.0784*** 0.101*** 0.0997*** 0.0993*** 0.0727** 0.101***
(0.0161) (0.0198) (0.0249) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0218) (0.0307) (0.0366)
-0.0675*** -0.0354** -0.0226 -0.0169 -0.0309** -0.0288** -0.0451*** -0.0619*** -0.0789***
(0.0122) (0.0143) (0.0172) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0150) (0.0204) (0.0247)
-0.0521*** -0.0803*** -0.0415** -0.0230* -0.0324*** -0.0452*** -0.0468*** -0.0282 -0.0208
(0.0155) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0146) (0.0212) (0.0246)
0.173*** 0.124*** 0.0665* 0.0192 0.0303 0.0200 0.00366 -0.0261 -0.0834
(0.0252) (0.0316) (0.0368) (0.0249) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0311) (0.0424) (0.0523)
-0.101*** -0.0535*** -0.0444* -0.0170 -0.0233 0.00303 -0.00858 0.00306 -0.0103
(0.0187) (0.0204) (0.0228) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0183) (0.0252) (0.0295)
-10.41*** -11.90*** -0.759 2.625 8.179*** 9.211*** 8.750*** 6.976* 8.032
(3.399) (3.714) (3.873) (2.743) (2.549) (2.499) (2.898) (4.034) (5.151)
-0.00132 -0.0110*** -0.00836* -0.0112*** -0.0165*** -0.0196*** -0.0189*** -0.0123*** -0.00355
(0.00327) (0.00401) (0.00454) (0.00357) (0.00352) (0.00342) (0.00369) (0.00418) (0.00528)
0.00119*** 0.000644* 0.000358 0.000127 -3.53e-05 2.44e-05 0.000115 0.000160 0.000215
(0.000297) (0.000344) (0.000391) (0.000277) (0.000269) (0.000269) (0.000318) (0.000433) (0.000528)
0.246** 0.0120 -0.137 -0.183* -0.0989 -0.0930 0.160 0.270* 0.155
(0.106) (0.128) (0.143) (0.0999) (0.0917) (0.0898) (0.106) (0.140) (0.170)
0.225*** 0.220*** 0.132* 0.163*** 0.144*** 0.139*** 0.120** 0.164** 0.114
(0.0646) (0.0713) (0.0771) (0.0540) (0.0524) (0.0522) (0.0607) (0.0816) (0.0944)
0.1000 0.120 -0.0480 -0.0993* -0.0863 -0.0803 -0.0841 -0.180** -0.374***
(0.0712) (0.0768) (0.0840) (0.0577) (0.0536) (0.0504) (0.0570) (0.0750) (0.0931)
0.0121*** 0.00961*** 0.00984*** 0.0100*** 0.00672*** 0.00612*** 0.00490*** 0.00405*** 0.00402***
(0.00105) (0.00110) (0.00127) (0.000923) (0.000875) (0.000842) (0.000961) (0.00120) (0.00147)
2.727*** 3.503*** 3.877*** 3.960*** 3.698*** 4.066*** 3.742*** 3.805*** 4.057***
(0.310) (0.371) (0.421) (0.302) (0.290) (0.293) (0.345) (0.474) (0.629)
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595
Standard errors in parentheses























Table 8.1 Log GDP per Capita
50q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90
2.111** 2.968*** 2.077*** 1.867*** 1.679*** 1.761*** 2.225*** 1.992*** 2.047***
(0.902) (0.452) (0.393) (0.341) (0.478) (0.464) (0.458) (0.284) (0.315)
16.22*** 14.10*** 16.26*** 14.70*** 14.48*** 12.14*** 10.76*** 11.01*** 8.456***
(3.002) (1.760) (1.573) (1.517) (2.245) (2.352) (2.394) (1.747) (2.088)
-2.101 -1.241 -0.708 1.972 3.692 5.099 6.856* 10.88*** 18.05***
(4.329) (2.530) (2.378) (2.328) (3.457) (3.541) (3.552) (2.503) (2.847)
0.0480 0.0378** 0.0606*** 0.0723*** 0.0817*** 0.100*** 0.0867*** 0.0764*** 0.0512***
(0.0337) (0.0170) (0.0148) (0.0131) (0.0186) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0122) (0.0138)
0.00790 0.0186** 0.0248*** 0.0328*** 0.0299*** 0.0241*** 0.0271*** 0.0304*** 0.0259***
(0.0127) (0.00760) (0.00669) (0.00590) (0.00850) (0.00840) (0.00834) (0.00548) (0.00593)
-1.713*** -1.228*** -1.054*** -0.774*** -0.661*** -0.782*** -0.687*** -0.877*** -0.474***
(0.287) (0.164) (0.153) (0.144) (0.206) (0.207) (0.203) (0.134) (0.142)
1.597*** 1.151*** 1.044*** 0.852*** 0.683*** 0.752*** 0.691*** 0.668*** 0.399***
(0.198) (0.112) (0.0983) (0.0928) (0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.0908) (0.102)
-0.0523 -0.106 -0.0333 -0.0919 -0.0157 0.131 0.242** 0.273*** 0.367***
(0.205) (0.130) (0.120) (0.105) (0.136) (0.125) (0.117) (0.0767) (0.0737)
-0.161 -0.228 -0.474** -0.547*** -0.674** -0.884*** -0.990*** -1.220*** -1.202***
(0.338) (0.277) (0.233) (0.209) (0.286) (0.277) (0.277) (0.201) (0.235)
0.459 0.513*** 0.487*** 0.450*** 0.539*** 0.750*** 0.647*** 0.660*** 0.375***
(0.294) (0.160) (0.139) (0.125) (0.176) (0.175) (0.170) (0.111) (0.105)
-150.3*** -108.2*** -87.67*** -82.61*** -65.10** -56.68** -45.74* -28.57 -35.30*
(44.94) (26.67) (22.27) (20.25) (28.26) (27.88) (26.76) (18.13) (19.21)
0.0871* 0.0556 0.0205 -0.00300 -0.0271 -0.0518 -0.0514 -0.0509** -0.0283
(0.0519) (0.0421) (0.0323) (0.0297) (0.0405) (0.0390) (0.0320) (0.0205) (0.0219)
-0.00578 -0.00574* -0.00383 -0.00402* -0.00500 -0.00528* -0.00834*** -0.00803*** -0.0103***
(0.00543) (0.00301) (0.00253) (0.00226) (0.00305) (0.00288) (0.00269) (0.00163) (0.00174)
-5.242*** -5.565*** -4.712*** -3.883*** -4.422*** -4.226*** -5.140*** -5.187*** -5.357***
(1.719) (0.888) (0.820) (0.722) (1.032) (0.960) (0.966) (0.638) (0.745)
-3.957*** -2.508*** -2.765*** -1.953*** -1.828*** -0.646 0.0977 0.607* 0.558
(0.966) (0.534) (0.457) (0.412) (0.587) (0.562) (0.550) (0.365) (0.429)
-3.058*** -3.027*** -2.560*** -2.030*** -1.938*** -1.621*** -1.316** -1.659*** -1.609***
(0.837) (0.451) (0.410) (0.401) (0.595) (0.595) (0.629) (0.445) (0.525)
-0.00367 -0.00553 0.00608 0.00824 0.0140 0.0238** 0.0135 0.0136** 0.0211***
(0.0207) (0.0104) (0.00869) (0.00775) (0.0105) (0.00988) (0.00916) (0.00564) (0.00517)
35.19*** 29.32*** 33.42*** 33.74*** 35.01*** 35.42*** 32.25*** 33.68*** 32.19***
(4.903) (2.780) (2.410) (2.148) (3.115) (3.102) (3.138) (2.035) (2.366)
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Trade





















51q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90
0.0417*** 0.0370** 0.0372** 0.0413*** 0.0399*** 0.0402** 0.0329*** 0.0192** 0.0243**
(0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0151) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0156) (0.0120) (0.00911) (0.0105)
0.00181 0.00724*** 0.00703*** 0.00951*** 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0119*** 0.0123*** 0.0107***
(0.00202) (0.00185) (0.00180) (0.00154) (0.00166) (0.00221) (0.00192) (0.00160) (0.00210)
1.117*** 1.028*** 1.113*** 0.989*** 0.948*** 0.955*** 0.810*** 0.697*** 0.554***
(0.0811) (0.0861) (0.0795) (0.0676) (0.0705) (0.0919) (0.0800) (0.0648) (0.0807)
-3.29e-05 -0.000595 -0.00132** -0.00145*** -0.00221*** -0.00215*** -0.00217*** -0.00155*** -0.00132***
(0.000549) (0.000563) (0.000557) (0.000478) (0.000481) (0.000604) (0.000458) (0.000354) (0.000443)
-0.00130*** -0.00114*** -0.000996*** -0.00100*** -0.000943*** -0.000666** -6.60e-05 0.000289 0.000253
(0.000253) (0.000282) (0.000257) (0.000213) (0.000219) (0.000277) (0.000224) (0.000179) (0.000234)
0.00685 0.0109 0.0111* 0.0126** 0.00806 0.0131* 0.0180*** 0.0176*** 0.0116**
(0.00746) (0.00727) (0.00656) (0.00548) (0.00545) (0.00685) (0.00564) (0.00439) (0.00500)
-0.00228 -0.00506 -0.00735 -0.0120*** -0.0121*** -0.0158*** -0.0176*** -0.0162*** -0.0122***
(0.00510) (0.00501) (0.00449) (0.00372) (0.00372) (0.00473) (0.00397) (0.00315) (0.00381)
-0.00390 -0.00756* -0.0124*** -0.00421 -0.00324 -0.00210 -0.00424 -0.00624*** -0.00283
(0.00379) (0.00385) (0.00360) (0.00314) (0.00334) (0.00436) (0.00303) (0.00231) (0.00267)
0.0148* 0.000911 0.00556 -0.000975 0.00316 -0.000901 -0.00593 -0.00385 -0.00455
(0.00830) (0.00790) (0.00814) (0.00713) (0.00731) (0.00933) (0.00778) (0.00536) (0.00625)
0.0199*** 0.0107 0.00249 0.00483 -0.00203 -0.00478 -0.00508 -0.00313 -0.000304
(0.00669) (0.00691) (0.00577) (0.00458) (0.00454) (0.00559) (0.00462) (0.00362) (0.00429)
-0.181 0.0363 -1.172 -1.401** -2.130*** -1.520* -3.672*** -4.264*** -4.673***
(0.832) (0.939) (0.827) (0.696) (0.721) (0.910) (0.737) (0.603) (0.752)
-0.000440 -0.000336 0.000533 0.000721 0.00177* 0.000922 3.10e-05 8.83e-05 -0.000257
(0.00107) (0.00108) (0.00102) (0.000963) (0.00104) (0.00130) (0.00116) (0.000813) (0.00129)
-6.08e-05 -0.000129 -0.000205** -0.000165** -0.000124 -0.000137 -7.20e-05 -3.05e-05 -6.31e-06
(0.000132) (0.000112) (9.64e-05) (7.88e-05) (7.82e-05) (9.51e-05) (7.84e-05) (6.24e-05) (7.14e-05)
0.0208 0.0587* 0.0255 0.0218 0.0112 0.0100 -0.00794 -0.00208 -0.0299
(0.0201) (0.0319) (0.0315) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0342) (0.0281) (0.0223) (0.0283)
0.0455*** 0.0396** 0.0338** 0.0526*** 0.0424*** 0.0445** 0.0311* 0.0257** 0.0245
(0.0174) (0.0179) (0.0168) (0.0143) (0.0150) (0.0195) (0.0163) (0.0125) (0.0160)
0.144*** 0.131*** 0.116*** 0.0931*** 0.0654*** 0.0552*** 0.0449*** 0.0472*** 0.0305**
(0.0184) (0.0200) (0.0185) (0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0177) (0.0149) (0.0120) (0.0147)
-0.00109*** -0.000857** -0.00106*** -0.00120*** -0.00123*** -0.000978*** -0.000723*** -0.000635*** -0.000585**
(0.000360) (0.000348) (0.000319) (0.000257) (0.000262) (0.000325) (0.000276) (0.000224) (0.000271)
-0.504*** -0.702*** -0.653*** -0.713*** -0.698*** -0.714*** -0.584*** -0.437*** -0.256**
(0.0965) (0.117) (0.104) (0.0859) (0.0873) (0.110) (0.0884) (0.0718) (0.0998)
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595
Standard errors in parentheses























52q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90
0.0227*** 0.0213*** 0.0153** 0.00485 -0.00184 -0.00295 -0.00487 0.00571 0.0107
(0.00833) (0.00804) (0.00714) (0.00885) (0.0111) (0.00947) (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0124)
0.00253** -3.56e-06 -0.000575 0.00106 0.000896 0.00265** 0.00412** 0.00423** 0.00615***
(0.00105) (0.00122) (0.000988) (0.00123) (0.00147) (0.00127) (0.00161) (0.00177) (0.00188)
0.322*** 0.385*** 0.418*** 0.428*** 0.460*** 0.454*** 0.454*** 0.463*** 0.431***
(0.0323) (0.0311) (0.0265) (0.0333) (0.0402) (0.0354) (0.0462) (0.0533) (0.0564)
0.00243*** 0.00205*** 0.00181*** 0.00137*** 0.00156*** 0.000869** 0.000295 -0.000672 -0.00128***
(0.000306) (0.000296) (0.000272) (0.000336) (0.000409) (0.000345) (0.000450) (0.000513) (0.000447)
0.000728*** 0.000537*** 0.000573*** 0.000327** 0.000366** 0.000304* 0.000179 1.82e-05 -0.000143
(0.000174) (0.000147) (0.000123) (0.000151) (0.000186) (0.000158) (0.000200) (0.000238) (0.000221)
-0.00546 -0.00236 -0.00177 -0.00429 -0.00554 -0.00895** -0.00489 -0.00607 0.00651
(0.00430) (0.00398) (0.00324) (0.00388) (0.00462) (0.00392) (0.00493) (0.00594) (0.00543)
0.00600** 0.00440 0.00525** 0.00595** 0.00701** 0.00754*** 0.00480 0.00529 -0.00662*
(0.00303) (0.00275) (0.00220) (0.00265) (0.00313) (0.00264) (0.00325) (0.00376) (0.00347)
-0.00780** 0.00434 0.00642*** 0.00874*** 0.00922*** 0.00829*** 0.0107*** 0.0105*** 0.0165***
(0.00305) (0.00275) (0.00214) (0.00249) (0.00287) (0.00235) (0.00278) (0.00310) (0.00291)
0.00609 -0.00358 -0.00419 0.00125 0.00163 0.00948* 0.0215*** 0.0232*** 0.0361***
(0.00628) (0.00596) (0.00471) (0.00530) (0.00607) (0.00504) (0.00594) (0.00628) (0.00640)
0.00185 0.0116*** 0.00947*** 0.00955*** 0.0102*** 0.00711** 0.00393 0.00156 0.00191
(0.00370) (0.00308) (0.00252) (0.00312) (0.00379) (0.00338) (0.00435) (0.00535) (0.00592)
1.590*** 0.303 -0.185 0.564 1.189* 1.615*** 2.502*** 3.173*** 3.660***
(0.513) (0.513) (0.417) (0.512) (0.610) (0.515) (0.658) (0.775) (0.689)
-0.000743 -0.000753 -0.000682 -0.000791 -0.00101 -0.000137 -0.000452 0.00114 0.00381***
(0.000949) (0.000863) (0.000665) (0.000773) (0.000868) (0.000664) (0.000780) (0.000839) (0.000768)
0.000176*** 0.000193*** 0.000233*** 0.000224*** 0.000207*** 0.000185*** 0.000212*** 0.000221** 0.000230***
(4.41e-05) (4.58e-05) (3.73e-05) (4.90e-05) (6.33e-05) (5.74e-05) (7.47e-05) (8.80e-05) (8.41e-05)
0.0714*** 0.0928*** 0.0784*** 0.0730*** 0.0647*** 0.0507*** 0.0464* 0.0426 0.0322
(0.0192) (0.0178) (0.0145) (0.0184) (0.0221) (0.0188) (0.0244) (0.0265) (0.0237)
0.000311 0.00264 -0.0139 -0.0228** -0.0276** -0.0308*** -0.0265* -0.0309** -0.0272
(0.0119) (0.0108) (0.00860) (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0106) (0.0139) (0.0151) (0.0169)
-0.00927 -0.0383*** -0.0473*** -0.0508*** -0.0400*** -0.0441*** -0.0414*** -0.0447*** -0.0293**
(0.00955) (0.00967) (0.00817) (0.0102) (0.0126) (0.0112) (0.0143) (0.0163) (0.0129)
-6.64e-05 0.000114 0.000219 0.000134 0.000139 -2.98e-05 -0.000128 8.50e-06 0.000156
(0.000229) (0.000204) (0.000163) (0.000192) (0.000228) (0.000194) (0.000249) (0.000283) (0.000285)
-0.273*** -0.0484 0.0458 0.0751 0.111 0.0728 0.0167 -0.0171 -0.129
(0.0626) (0.0591) (0.0506) (0.0641) (0.0815) (0.0708) (0.0926) (0.106) (0.102)
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595
Standard errors in parentheses




























Log GDP per Capita ( )*** ( )** ( )*** ( )*** 9 9 3 0 11 21 0 32
Sum of Stars for  
Significant Coefficients



















Clustered Error IV, no Variable Omitted
Quantile Level Estimates
Independent Variables Instrumented
Summary of Signiﬁcance in 
Quantile Estimates
Summary of Signiﬁcance in 
Convergence Estimates
Log GDP per Capita (-)*** (-)** (-)*** (-)*** 9 9 3 0 11 21 0 32
Life Expectancy (-)*** 9 8 5 0 3 22 0 25
Literacy (+)*** (+)* (+)* 9 9 9 5 0 27 0 32
Gross Enrolment Ratio (- 2 1 3 0 9 2 0 * * * ) -1 16
Urban (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 8 8 -7 5 9 0 22 -8 39
Trade (+)*** 1 8 -6 5 3 0 15 -7 25
Executive Constraints (-)*** (+)** 9 -9 4 -1 2 3 13 -10 28
Democracy (+)*** (+)* -7 9 -6 5 4 0 14 -13 31 Democracy (+) (+) -7 9 -6 5 4 0 14 -13 31
FDI inﬂows (-)* (-)*** -6 3 -3 6 0 4 10 -10 24
FDI outflows (+)*** (-)*** (+)*** 2 -7 0 3 6 3 5 -7 21
Pop Density in Agr Land (log) (+)** (-)*** -2 8 1 5 2 3 14 -2 21
Pop Density Growth 1 -6 -5 5 0 0 8 -13 21
Low Risk Premium (-)* (+)*** -1 3 2 -9 3 1 7 -1 12
Low Inﬂation (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 6 1 0 -1 9 0 5 -10 24
54